As multi-agent systems proliferate and share more and more user data, new approaches are needed to protect sensitive data while still guaranteeing successful operation. To address this need, we present a private multi-agent LQ control framework. We consider problems in which each agent has linear dynamics and the agents are coupled by a quadratic cost. Generating optimal control values for the agents is a centralized operation, and we therefore introduce a cloud computer into the network for this purpose. The cloud is tasked with aggregating agents' outputs, computing control inputs, and transmitting these inputs to the agents, which apply them in their state updates. Agents' state information can be sensitive and we therefore protect it using differential privacy. Differential privacy is a statistical notion of privacy enforced by adding noise to sensitive data before sharing it, and agents will therefore add noise to all data before sending it to the cloud. The result is a private multi-agent LQG framework in which agents' states are protected from both the cloud and other agents. Adding noise to agents' data certainly impacts the performance of the system, and we provide a trade-off between agents' privacy levels and the entropy seen at the cloud as a measure of how difficult it is to compute control values when privacy is enforced. We further characterize this system by bounding the accuracy with which an adversary could predict agents' states by using the differentially private information they share. Simulation results are provided to validate the theoretical developments made.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides the privacy background needed for the rest of the paper. Section III defines the cloud-enabled differentially private LQG problem. Section IV then gives a closed-form solution to this problem and provides an algorithm for implementing it, as well as bounds on the entropy induced by privacy and bounds on error when predicting agents' states using private information. Next, we provide numerical simulations in Section V, and then Section VI concludes the paper.
II. REVIEW OF DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
In this section, we review the notion of differential privacy and its implementation. Differential privacy is a rigorous notion of privacy which allows accurate analyses of aggregate data while preserving the privacy of individuals [9] , [21] . Differential privacy is an attractive means of protecting sensitive data because post-processing on private data does not reduce its privacy guarantees. In particular, filtering private data is permitted without affecting the privacy of an individual. Moreover, once differential privacy is implemented, an adversary with complete knowledge of the mechanism used to privatize data has no advantage over an adversary without this knowledge, meaning that differential privacy is robust to mechanism knowledge [8] , [9] .
For all of these reasons, we will implement differential privacy in a multi-agent LQ setting. Two types of privacy are considered below. First the notion of differential privacy is reviewed for static databases. Second, privacy for trajectories of dynamical systems is discussed, and both forms of privacy will be applied in Section IV. We present both because this paper uses two instantiations of differential privacy for different data types, and we present this background to highlight the intricacies of jointly using these two privacy formulations. We first review the basic definitions required for formally defining differential privacy and then describe the privacy mechanisms we use in the remainder of the paper. Below, we use the notation [ℓ] = {1, . . . , ℓ} for ℓ ∈ N.
A. Differential Privacy for Static Databases
We begin with differential privacy for static data [9] , [12] . Consider a collection of N agents, where agent i has sensitive data r i ∈ R ni for some n i ∈ N. We assemble the data of all agents into the vector r := r T 1
. . . r T N T ∈ R n , where n = N i=1 n i . Differential privacy for databases seeks to protect sensitive data of individuals while allowing for accurate aggregate queries of groups of users. It does so by making adjacent databases produce responses to queries which are similar in a precise sense, making the databases approximately indistinguishable to the recipient of the queries' outputs. A query is a map q : D → R n , where D is the collection of all datasets of interest which we treat as vectors in R n . An adversary or eavesdropper only has access to these privatized outputs and does not have access to the underlying data which produced them. Therefore, the definition of adjacency is a key component of any privacy implementation as it specifies which pieces of sensitive data must be made approximately indistinguishable to any adversary or eavesdropper in order to protect their exact values.
The adjacency relation used for database-style privacy in this setting is defined below. where Adj β (r,r) = 1 if r andr are adjacent in the above sense and Adj β (r,r) = 0 otherwise. △
In words, two databases are adjacent if and only if they differ in at most one entry and this difference is bounded by β. Using this definition of adjacency, we next define the 2-norm sensitivity of a query which will be used below in defining a privacy mechanism.
Definition 2.A. (Sensitivity for Databases)
The 2-norm sensitivity of a query q is defined as the greatest distance between two query responses which correspond to adjacent databases. Formally,
The sensitivity of a query is used to determine how much noise must be added to enforce differential privacy.
Noise is added by a mechanism, which is a randomized map used to implement differential privacy. It is the role of a mechanism to approximate queries' outputs with private responses. Below, we give a formal definition of differential privacy for static databases which specifies the probabilistic guarantees that a mechanism must provide.
To do so, we first fix a probability space (Ω,F ,P). This definition considers outputs in the space R n and uses the Borel σ-algebra over R n , denoted B n [22] . 
In words, for two adjacent databases the outputs of the mechanism should be statistically close in the sense defined above. The constants ǫ and δ tune the level of privacy afforded to the agents, and typical values of ǫ range from 0.1 to ln 3, while values of δ are usually kept below 0.05. In general, smaller values of each provide stronger privacy guarantees.
We will now formally define the Gaussian mechanism for the database setting. The Gaussian mechanism perturbs query outputs with noise drawn from a Gaussian distribution, and it is defined in terms of the Q-function, which is given by
Definition 4.A. (Gaussian Mechanism for Databases)
Let privacy parameters ǫ > 0 and δ ∈ (0, 1 /2) be given.
Let q : D → R n be a query and denote its 2-norm sensitivity by ∆ 2 q. The Gaussian mechanism is defined by M(r) = q(r) + w, where w ∼ N (0, σ 2 ) and σ is bounded according to
B. Differential Privacy for Dynamic Systems
Having defined privacy for databases, we now define the notion of differential privacy for dynamic systems to keep the trajectories of individuals differentially private. Below, we will consider vector-valued trajectories of the form
where Z (k) ∈ R d for all k. We also define the norm
where . p is the ordinary p-norm on R d . We further define the set
As above, we consider a collection of N agents, and we denote agent i's state trajectory by x i . The k th element of the trajectory x i is denoted by x i (k) ∈ R ni for some n i ∈ N. The state trajectory x i is contained in the set ℓ ni 2 , which is the set of sequences of vectors in R ni whose finite truncations are all in ℓ ni 2 . Formally, we define the truncation operator P T over trajectories according to
and we say that
The trajectory space for all N agents in aggregate is thenl
As for database privacy, the choice of adjacency relation is a critical part of any differential privacy implementation for trajectories. We define our adjacency relation now over the spacel n 2 defined above. is defined as the greatest distance between two output trajectories which correspond to adjacent state trajectories.
Formally,
Next, we give a formal definition of differential privacy for dynamic systems which specifies the probabilistic guarantees that a mechanism must provide. To do so, we will use the probability space (Ω,F ,P) that was defined above. This definition considers outputs in the spacel q 2 and uses a σ-algebra overl
We omit a formal construction of this σ-algebra as the technical details are not particularly important in this work, though this construction can be bound in [22] . 
In some cases, it is possible to set δ = 0, and (ǫ, 0)-differential privacy is referred to simply as ǫ-differential privacy. In this paper, we consider only cases in which δ > 0 because enforcing (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy can be done with the Gaussian mechanism, which adds Gaussian noise for privacy, and using this mechanism allows us to draw from a substantial existing literature on LQG control. Toward doing so, we define the Gaussian mechanism for trajectories next. , and denote its 2-norm sensitivity by ∆ ℓ2 G. Then the Gaussian mechanism for (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy takes the form
where w is a stochastic process with w (k) ∼ N 0, σ 2 I q , I q is the q × q identity matrix, and σ is bounded according to
In words, the Gaussian mechanism adds i.i.d Gaussian noise point-wise in time to the output of the system to keep its state trajectory private. For convenience, we define the function
and we will use the Gaussian mechanism to enforce differential privacy for the remainder of the paper.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section we introduce the multi-agent LQG tracking control problem to be solved privately. First, we give the agents' individual dynamics and equivalent network-level dynamics. Then, we introduce a cloud computer and formally state the private control problem to be solved. Below, we use the notation P 0 and P ≻ 0 to indicate that a matrix P is positive semi-definite or positive definite, respectively. Similarly, we write A B and A ≻ B to indicate that A − B 0 and A − B ≻ 0, respectively. We use the notation diag(P 1 , . . . , P n ) to denote the matrix direct sum of P 1 through P n ; if these matrices are square, the notation diag(P 1 , . . . , P n ) denotes a block diagonal matrix with blocks P 1 through P n .
A. Multi-Agent LQ Formulation
Consider a collection of N agents, indexed over i ∈ [N ]. At time k, agent i has state vector x i (k) ∈ R ni for some n i ∈ N, which evolves according to
where
is process noise, and where
and B i ∈ R ni×mi are time-invariant matrices. The probability distribution of the process noise is given as
, and all such terms have finite variance. Furthermore, w i (k) and w j (k) are uncorrelated for all agents i and j and all times k. In addition, w i (k) does not depend on prior disturbances
it may be explicitly dependent upon x(k) and u(k).
To analyze the agents' behavior in aggregate, we define the network-level state and control vectors as
, we have the network-level state dynamics
We consider infinite-horizon problems in which the agents jointly incur the cost
where Q ∈ R n×n and R ∈ R m×m are symmetric and positive definite. The vectorx i (k) ∈ R ni is agent i's desired state at time k, and we define the network-level desired state at time
. The full aggregate reference trajectory is denoted {x(k)} k∈N , and it is assumed that
is finite, i.e.,x (k) has a limiting value. The linear dynamics in Equation (1) and quadratic cost in Equation (2) together define a linear-quadratic (LQ) optimal control problem, a canonical class of optimal control problems July 16, 2018 DRAFT [23] - [25] . The structure of this cost function allows us to penalize deviation from the reference trajectoryx and we will do this below. The problem considered below is distinct from the existing literature because it incorporates the exchange of differentially privatized data in order to protect agents' state trajectories, which, to the best of our knowledge, has not been done before in an LQ tracking control problem. More formally, we will solve Problem 1, stated now.
Problem 1. Given an initial random measurement x (0) ∈ R n of the network state,
subject to the network dynamics
while keeping agent i's state trajectory and desired trajectory differentially private with agent-provided privacy parameters (ǫ i , δ i ).
B. Cloud-Based Aggregation
In Problem 1, the cost J is generally non-separable due to its quadratic form. This non-separability means that J cannot be minimized by each agent using only knowledge of its own state. Instead, each agent's optimal control vector will, generally, depend upon all states in the network. To compute the required optimal control vectors, one may be tempted to have an agent aggregate all agents' states and then perform the required computations, though this inequitably distributes the computational load across agents, and, in some settings, the aggregate cost J may only be known by a central network operator. We therefore introduce a cloud computer to aggregate and process information and distribute it to the agents. The technology of cloud computing provides the ability to communicate with many agents, rapidly perform demanding computations, and broadcast the results. Moreover, these capabilities can be seamlessly and remotely added into networks of agents, making the cloud a natural choice of central aggregator for this work [13] .
At time k, the cloud requests from agent i the value y i (k) = C i x i (k), where C i ∈ R pi×ni is a constant matrix.
We refer to y i as either agent i's output or as agent i's state measurement. To protect its state trajectory, agent i sends a differentially private form of y i (k) to the cloud. Using these values from each agent, the cloud computes the optimal controller for each agent at time k. The cloud sends these control values to the agents, the agents use them in their local state updates, and then this process of exchanging information repeats. Next we specify the exact manner in which each agent makes its transmissions to the cloud differentially private.
C. Differentially Private Communications
At time k, agent i's transmission of y i (k) to the cloud can potentially reveal its state trajectory, thereby compromising agent i's privacy. Accordingly, agent i adds noise to the state measurement y i (k) before sending it to the cloud in order to keep its state trajectory differentially private. Agent i first selects its own privacy parameters July 16, 2018 DRAFT ǫ i > 0 and δ i ∈ (0, 1 /2). Supposing that agent i uses the adjacency relation Adj bi for some b i > 0 (cf. Definition 1.B),
we have the following elementary lemma concerning the ℓ 2 -norm sensitivity of y i , which we denote ∆ ℓ2 y i .
value of a matrix.
Proof: Consider two trajectories
With the bound in Lemma 1, agent i sends the cloud the private output
where the privacy noise v i (k) ∼ N 0, σ 2 i I ni is a Gaussian random variable, and where
, and we have
In the output Equation (3), measurement noise can be included and all of the forthcoming analyses in this paper readily accommodate this change. However, as this paper is focused on bounding the effects of privacy, we exclude the measurement noise from the subsequent developments in order to isolate the effects of privacy in particular.
In addition to state measurements, the agents' reference trajectories are a significant source of "side information,"
which, if disclosed, can reveal the agents' intentions and weaken the privacy of its trajectory. Only the limiting value of agent i's reference trajectory, denotedx i , will be needed by the cloud and agent i will add noise to it before sending it to the cloud. The value ofx i is static in time and we therefore use the database notion of differential privacy for keeping it private. To protectx i , agent i selects privacy parametersǭ i andδ i . Then privacy noise is added according tox
where agent i chooses the privacy noise for its reference viaw i ∼ N 0,σ In this privacy implementation, we assume that all matrices A i , B i , C i , V i , and W i are public information. In addition, we impose the following assumption on the dynamics and cost that are considered. Assumption 1. In the cost J, Q = Q T ≻ 0 and R = R T ≻ 0. In addition, the pair (A, B) is controllable, and there exists a matrix F such that Q = F T F and such that the pair (A, F ) is observable. △ Assumption 1 guarantees the existence of a solution to a certain algebraic Riccati equation that we will encounter below [24, Chapter 4] . In addition, we assume thatx i (0), the expected value of the agent i's initial state, is publicly known, along with agent i's privacy parameters ǫ i , δ i ,ǭ i andδ i . We also assume that the matrices Q and R are July 16, 2018 DRAFT known only to the cloud and that the cloud does not share these matrices with any agents or eavesdroppers. With this privacy implementation in hand, we next give a private reformulation of Problem 1.
D. Reformulation of Problem 1 with Privacy
Having specified exactly the sense in which privacy is implemented in Problem 1, we now give an equivalent statement of Problem 1, as an LQG control problem [15] .
over all control signals u with u (k) ∈ R m , subject to the dynamics and output equations
where C = diag (C 1 , . . . , C N ) and wherex (0) := E [x (0)] is public and agent i has specified its privacy parameters
IV. PRIVATE LQG TRACKING CONTROL
In this section we solve Problem 2, with the understanding that this solution also solves Problem 1. Problem 2 takes the form of a linear quadratic Gaussian tracking control problem, which is a well-studied problem in the optimal control literature [15] , [26] . We first solve Problem 2 and then quantify the effects of privacy upon this solution. Below, we use the notation λ i (·) to denote the i th largest eigenvalue of a matrix and the notation s i (·)
to denote the i th largest singular value of a matrix.
A. Solving Problem 2
Due to the stochastic terms in the system, the controllers we develop cannot rely on the exact value of x (k).
Instead, the controllers must rely on its expected value conditioned on all past inputs and outputs, denoted
in which I(k) denotes all information available to the controller at time k and is defined as
Problem 2 is an infinite-horizon discrete-time LQG tracking control problem, and it is known [27] that the optimal controller for such problems takes the form
and
Here, K is the unique positive semidefinite solution to the discrete algebraic Riccati equation
Computing the state estimate E [x (k) | I(k)] can be done for infinite time horizons using a time-invariant Kalman filter [24, Section 5.2] . This filter has a recursive update law of the form
where the a posteriori error covariance matrix Σ is given by
The a priori error covariance matrix Σ is the unique positive semidefinite solution to the discrete algebraic Riccati
Upon substituting Equation (4) into Equation (9), the update law for the Kalman filter takes the form
As discussed in Section III-B, the cloud is responsible for generating control values for each agent at each point in time using Equation (4), and it therefore runs the Kalman filter in Equation (9) . Here, we develop an algorithm for the implementation of the controller for each agent at each point in time. The flow of information in the network first has agent i sendỹ i (k) to the cloud at time k, then has the cloud form a network level output vector
and use it to estimatex (k + 1). Next, the cloud computes u * (k) = Lx (k)+M g, and finally the cloud sends u * i (k) to agent i. The control signals u * i (k) preserve the differential privacy of all private data, and therefore sharing agent i's input signal with other agents does not incur any privacy loss.
With respect to implementation, the terms K, L, Σ, Σ, and g can be all computed a priori by the cloud a single time and then used repeatedly in generating control values to send to the agents, substantially reducing the cloud's computational burden at runtime, and allowing it to quickly generate state estimates and control values. With this in mind, we now state the full solution to Problem 2 below in Algorithm 1.
The information exchanged by the agents and the cloud at time k is summarized in Figure 1 .
Algorithm 1: Differentially Private LQG (Solution to Problem 2)
Initialize the cloud with all public information 2 For all i, initialize agent i with A i , B i , C i . Agent i chooses (ǫ i , δ i ) and knows its exact initial state x i (0) but does not share it. In addition, agent i chooses (ǭ i ,δ i ) and computesx i and sends it to the cloud 3 In the cloud, find K using Equation (7), then precompute L and M using Equation (5) and (6) respectively, Σ according to Equation (10) , and g using Equation (8) 
In the cloud, computex(k) with Equation (9) Agent i updates its state via 
B. Quantifying the Effects of Privacy
Algorithm 1 solves Problem 2, though it is intuitively clear that adding noise for the sake of privacy will diminish the ability of the cloud to compute optimal control values. Indeed, the purpose of differential privacy in this problem is to protect an agent's state from the cloud, other agents, and any eavesdroppers. Since the agents' state values are protected, the cloud is forced to estimate agents' states in order to generate control values for them. Accordingly, one may wish to quantify the ability of the cloud to accurately estimate the agents' state values, which is the focus of this subsection.
The cloud both implements a Kalman filter and computes the controller u * (k), though noise added for privacy only affects the Kalman filter. To see this, note that the network-level controller defined in Equation (4) takes the form u * (k) = Lx (k) + M g, while the optimal controller with no privacy noise (i.e., v (k) ≡ 0 for all k) would take the same form with the expectation carried out only over the process noise. Similarly, in the deterministic case of v (k) ≡ 0 and w (k) ≡ 0 for all k, the optimal controller is u * (k) = Lx (k) + M g. The only difference between these controllers comes from changes in the estimate of x (k) or in using x (k) exactly. This is an example of the so-called "certainty equivalence principle" [24] , and it demonstrates that the controller in Algorithm 1 is entirely unaware of the presence or absence of noise. Instead, the effects of noise in the system are compensated for only by the Kalman filter defined in Equation (9), and we therefore examine the impact of privacy noise upon the Kalman filter in Algorithm 1. Related work in [10] specifies procedures for designing differentially private Kalman filters, though here we use a Kalman filter to process private data and quantify the effects of privacy upon it. To the best of our knowledge this is the first study to do so.
One natural way to study this trade-off is through bounding the information content in the Kalman filter as a function of the privacy noise, as differential privacy explicitly seeks to mask sensitive information by corrupting it with noise. In our case, we consider the differential entropy in the error inx (k) as a proxy for the information content of the signals sent to the cloud [28] . Shannon entropy has been used to quantify the effects of differential privacy in other settings, including in distributed linear control systems where database-type differential privacy is applied [26] . Though differential entropy does not have the same axiomatic foundation as Shannon entropy, it is useful for the Gaussian distribution because it bounds the extent of the sublevel sets of R −1 , where R (y) = 1 − 2Q (y), i.e., the volume of covariance ellipsoids. We can therefore quantify the effects of differentially private masking upon the cloud by studying how privacy noise changes ln det (Σ), which is within a constant factor of the differential entropy ofx. The analysis we present differs from previous work because we apply trajectory-level differential privacy and quantify the resulting differential entropy in a Kalman filter that processes these trajectories. Toward presenting this result, we have the following lemma concerning the determinants of matrices related by a matrix inequality.
Lemma 2. Let P 0 and Q 0 satisfy P Q. Then det (P ) ≥ det (Q) and ln det (P ) ≥ ln det (Q).
Proof: This follows from the monotonicity of ln and the fact that
whenever X Y .
Another preliminary lemma needed is Hadamard's inequality, which we state now in the form in which it will be used below.
Proof: See [29, Theorem 9.B.5] .
The next lemma concerns relating the product of a collection to the maximum element of that collection.
Lemma 4. Let {a 1 , . . . , a n } be a finite collection of real scalars. Then
Proof: See Page 71 of [30] .
Below we will also relate the diagonal elements of symmetric matrices to the largest eigenvalues of such matrices, using the following lemma.
Proof: This follows from the Courant minimax principle; see, e.g., [31] , Page 179.
Next, we have the following lemma which gives a matrix upper bound on solutions to a discrete algebraic Riccati equation.
Lemma 6. Suppose Σ is the unique positive semi-definite solution to the discrete time algebraic Riccati Equation (11), where C is diagonal, and define
Proof: This follows from Theorem 2 in [32] .
We now present our main results on bounding the log-determinant of the steady state Kalman filter error covariance in the private LQG problem. In particular, we study the log-determinant of the a priori error covariance, Σ, because Σ measures the error in the cloud's predictions about the state of the system. Bounding the log-determinant of Σ therefore bounds the entropy seen at the cloud when making predictions about the state of the network in the presence of noise added for privacy. 
with η defined as in Lemma 6 , and where the term
is the only one affected by privacy.
Proof: With the hypothesis that C is diagonal, we see that
which gives
Lemma 6 then gives
where applying Lemma 2 gives
The argument of the determinant on the right-hand side is a positive-definite matrix, and applying Lemma 3 therefore gives
Applying Lemma 4, then provides the bound
Using Lemma 5 next provides
Taking the logarithm of both sides then gives the desired result.
Remark 1. To interpret Theorem 1, we can consider the particular case in which C i = I ni for all i, indicating that the cloud simply requests each agent's state at each point in time, in which W i = ωI ni , indicating that each agent has identical noise covariance for its process noise, and in which ǫ i =ǭ i = ǫ and δ i =δ i = δ for all i and some ǫ > 0 and δ ∈ 0, 1 2 . In this case, σ i = σ for all i and we find
If the other terms in the denominator are small in Theorem 1, then one finds that
indicating that, in this case, a linear change in the variance of privacy noise σ incurs a log-of-quadratic increase in entropy.
To complement this entropy upper bound, we will next present an entropy lower bound. Toward doing so, we present the following lemma.
Lemma 7. If P ∈ R n×n and Q ∈ R n×n are positive definite Hermitian matrices, then det(P + Q) ≥ det P + det Q.
Proof: This is implied by Minkowski's determinant theorem [33, Corollary 8.4.15] .
Lemma 8. Let P ∈ R n×n and Q ∈ R n×n be positive definite Hermitian matrices with p 1 ≥ p 2 ≥ · · · ≥ p n and q 1 ≥ q 2 ≥ · · · ≥ q n denoting their eigenvalues, respectively. Then
Proof: See the proof of Theorem 1 in [34] .
Next, we introduce the following lemma rearranging the terms in the algebraic Riccati equation.
Lemma 9. The algebraic Riccati equation given in Equation (11) can be rewritten as
Proof: This can be shown using the well-known Sherman-Morrison-Woodbury matrix identity [35] . See [36, Section 1] for further details.
Lemma 9 further facilitates the development of entropy lower bounds and allows us to repurpose results from the existing literature. Toward doing so, we now introduce the following Lemma.
Lemma 10. Let Σ ≻ 0 be the solution to the discrete time algebraic Riccati Equation (11) . Then
Theorem 2. Let Σ ≻ 0 be the solution to the discrete time algebraic Riccati Equation (11), and let λ 1 (W ) ≥ · · · ≥ λ n (W ) denote the eigenvalues of W . Then
Proof: Using Lemma 2, in Lemma 10, we find
Using Lemma 7 we find
Using the fact that det (M N ) = det (M ) det (N ) , we write
In order to find the lower bound for the right-hand side of Equation (13), the term in the denominator needs to be maximized. The matrices C T V −1 C and W are positive definite, and using Lemma 8, an upper bound for the denominator in Equation (13) is given by
which follows from Lemma 4. Since λ i C T V −1 C and λ i (W ) are positive we can write max λ
n (W ), and we have
The theorem follows by substituting this bound in Equation (13) .
Together, Theorems 1 and 2 give entropy bounds that can be used to balance the privacy needs of users.
Specifically, while a user may be tempted to provide very small privacy parameters, these results quantify the extent to which this is harmful in generating control values. These results can be used, for example, to place bounds on admissible privacy parameters or, in other cases to estimate the degradation in performance that results from very small privacy parameters based on the increases in entropy that result.
C. Quantifying an Adversary's Capabilities
Thus far, we have developed and analyzed an implementation of differential privacy in feedback control in the form of an LQG tracking control problem. The sensitive data of each agent is protected by ensuring private communications through adding noise, though beyond the proceeding analysis, one may wonder how accurately an adversary can predict the next state of an agent by eavesdropping on the privatized data transmissions in the network.
To answer this question we develop bounds on the mean square error (MSE) of such a prediction, given by
where x pred (k) denotes an adversary's prediction of the agents' states given access to all data transmitted in the network. We present the following theorem to provide analytical MSE bounds quantifying an adversary's capabilities to infer the states of the agents from the provided differential privacy implementation.
Theorem 3. Suppose that an adversary intercepts all communications between the agents and the cloud and has all public information. Then, for any post-processing method that they apply in predicting the next state of all agents collectively, the MSE of their prediction will always be bounded below (under the same conditions as Theorems 1
and 2) according to
Proof: The Kalman filter is the optimal estimator in this setting (linear systems with Gaussian noise) in the sense that it gives the minimum mean square error in the predictions it makes [37] . The MSE of the prediction is equal to the trace of the a priori error covariance matrix, which itself is the solution to the algebraic Riccati Equation (11) . Thus, for a Kalman filter, MSE = tr(Σ). With this in mind, we can lower-bound the prediction error for any estimator by lower bounding tr(Σ). To do so, we obtain the following equation by taking the trace of Equation (12):
Next we use the fact that for Γ 1 ≻ 0 and
where we have used that
for all i. Using this fact, we find
which completes the proof.
These bounds apply not only to Algorithm 1, but to trajectory-level privacy implementations for any linear dynamical system and may therefore be of independent interest.
Theorem 3 provides a lower bound on the MSE for an adversary's prediction for an entire collection of agents.
This result can be extended to investigate the ability of an adversary to predict the next state of a single agent, which gives a more granular perspective on an adversary's ability to predict the state of individuals.
Corollary 1. Assume an adversary intercepts all communications and has all public information in Algorithm 1.
Then their prediction of the next state for any single agent is (under the same conditions as Theorems 1 and 2) is bounded by
where C i,j is the j-th diagonal entry of the matrix C i .
Proof: This proof is substantially similar to the proof of Theorem 3 and is therefore omitted.
Having characterized an adversary's capabilities in this setting we will next provide numerical simulations for both Algorithm 1 and the MSE bounds derived in this section.
V. CASE STUDY

A. Simulation Results of Algorithm 1
In this section, we present simulation results for an implementation of Algorithm 1, and we consider a system consisting of N = 10 agents. Agent i's state is denoted by x i (k) ∈ R 3 for all k, and each state trajectory is in the setl We also select C i = I 3×3 . The process noise is set to be W i = I 3×3 . The reference trajectory for agent i has
with the limiting valuex i = [ 1 1 1 ] T for all i.
We consider the case in which the all agents select identical privacy parameters, namely, (ǫ i , δ i ) = (ln 2, 0.001) for all i, giving σ i = 4.61. In addition,x i is made private withw i , where the privacy parameters are set by
15 for all i. For these simulations, the matrices Q and R were randomly chosen positive definite matrices for which the off-diagonal elements were non-zero, meaning that the cost J is not separable over agents. Algorithm 1 was simulated for 100 timesteps, and the results of this simulation are shown in Figures 2 and 3 . The effects of privacy upon the cost are illustrated in Figure 2 . As expected, the quadratic cost in a private network implementation is higher than an equivalent network of agents in which privacy is not enforced.
However, this increase becomes relatively modest over time, which indicates that privacy does not substantially increase costs over long time horizons. In Figure 3 , the estimated trajectory of the agent, which is the optimal estimate (in the least squares sense), shows temporal variations from the true trajectory. However, even with the degraded information reported to the cloud, the states of the agents are still regulated close to their desired values, indicating that this degradation does not preclude acceptable system performance. In Figure 4 , the dependency of entropy on privacy parameters ǫ and δ is further illustrated. Figure 4 shows the effect on ln det Σ as we vary the privacy parameters ǫ and δ. The value of ln det Σ is monotonically decreasing as ǫ and δ increase, which is intuitive because weaker privacy guarantees should reduce entropy. This demonstrates that changing the overall privacy level in the system indeed results in predictable changes in the behavior of the entropy of the system, as were shown by the bounds developed in Theorem 1 and 2.
B. Simulation Results of Theorem 3
In this section we give a numerical example for the results given in Corollary 1, which also demonstrates the results of Theorem 3. We assume that an adversary is intercepting all communications in the network implemented in Section V-A using that same problem formulation. The results of this simulation are illustrated in Tables I and   II state to remain near its desired trajectory, and this behavior was typical for all agents in our simulation runs. The bound in Corollary 1 compares favorably with the exact value of the MSE in the adversary's predictions, indicating that our bound provides an accurate estimate of an adversary's minimum MSE. It can therefore be used to inform agents' privacy parameters based on their desire to avoid leaking information to an adversary. Moreover, in light of the agents' states being near to 1, an MSE of approximately 3 suggests that an adversary can learn little about agents that are using differential privacy in this problem.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have studied the problem of distributed linear quadratic optimal control with agent-specified differential privacy requirements. We have related this problem to the well-studied LQG problem and have shown Fig. 4 . Effects of differential privacy parameters ǫ and δ on entropy. As we increase the privacy parameters the network is less private and entropy decreases, as expected. Moreover, it can be seen that the largest changes in entropy occur when ǫ and δ are small, which demonstrates that even small changes to very private parameters can substantially improve system function. how to bound the uncertainty in the network-level joint state estimate in terms of the privacy parameters specified by the individual agents. This work enables agents to collectively solve an optimal control problem without revealing sensitive data. Future applications include autonomous driving, in which sensitive user location data may be shared, and smart power girds, in which users' power consumption data is shared.
